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HEGEL ON PROVING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 
In w of the Science o~ Logic in his Encyclopedia oJ the Philo- 
sophical Sciences Hegel presents some reflection on the historical at- 
tempts at proving God's existence and properties. Complaining about 
what "rational theology," operating on "understanding" (Verstand) 
instead of "reason" (VernunJt), has been able to accomplish in 
conceptualizing the object of its inquiry, Hegel develops this argu- 
ment in some comments of the Zusatz on the traditional existence 
proofs: 
Now, in this matter, the main point to be noted is that demonstra- 
tion, as the understanding employs it, means the dependence of 
one truth on another. In such proofs we have a presupposition-- 
something firm and fast, from which something else follows; we 
exhibit the dependence of some truth from an assumed starting- 
point. Hence, if this mode of demonstration is applied to the 
existence of God, it can only mean that the being of God is to 
depend on other terms, which will then constitute the ground of 
his being. It is at once evident that this will lead to some mistake: 
for God must be simply and solely the ground of everything, and 
in so far not dependent upon anything else. And a perception of 
this danger has in modern times led some to say that God's 
existence is not capable of proof, but must be immediately or 
intuitively apprehended. 1 
Though containing familiar elements in its orientation to the tradi- 
tional proofs and the traditional concept of God, the aim of this 
argument is unusual in the history of rational theology. In the still 
more recent modern times of the next century, unprovability has of 
course also led some to say that God's existence must be immediately 
1 Hegel's Logic, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975, p. 58. 
Corresponding references in the original are made to the Wissenschaft der Logik 
of the Enzyldopiidie der Philosophischen WissenschaJten irn Grundrisse (Vol. 8 
in Hegel's Werke, Surkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1970), cf. p. 105. Page 
numbers to these sources are hereafter designated 'HL' and 'WL' respectively. 
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rejected; however, neither reaction seems to have much to do with 
the "danger" that Hegel envisions here, or the particular theoretical 
impossibility that he sees obstructing the attempt ever to devise such 
arguments. Hegel's argument, itself a demonstration of sorts for esta- 
blishing a conclusion about (how to establish conclusions about) God, 
goes beyond the standard Humean criticism of contingent demonstra- 
tion tailored more closely to exhibits of evidence and principles of 
inference contained in specific versions. In an attack, rather, on a 
pervasive mistake endemic to a "mode" of theological argumentation~ 
Hegel's criticism may indeed seem to go so far beyond as to make 
it difficult to see exactly how the point being argued relates to any 
specific historical attempts at all. On the other hand, while Hegel's 
more global refutation out-Humes Hume as a wholesale elimination of 
a broad range of theistic arguments, its ambition is more modest than 
any of the classical indictments that rational theology has handed down 
against God's existence itself. While an a priori demonstration of sorts, 
Hegel's proposal is not an "ontological" disproof of the existence of 
God; Hegel in fact accepts, we will see, the ontological proof for the 
existence of God, and appears to subscribe to some empirical argu- 
mentation as well. Hegel's ontological disproof of a method of de- 
monstration purports a wholesale elimination of a broad program of 
proofs affirming God's existence in the wrong way, and thus may 
seem to offer at a more fundamental level an account of why the more 
limited kind of criticism against the traditional proofs should ulti- 
mately win, or at least the arguments themselves lose. 
Hegel's argument in this passage does not at any rate seem very 
convincing. At face value the argument appears to assert a relation 
of two definitions and a modus-tollens deduction out of that relation. 
In schematic form this argument would run as follows: 
1. By definition of what a contingent demonstration of the under- 
standing is, if there were to be any successful demonstration for the 
existence of God, then the truth of the conclusion (in this instance 
that God exists) would have to depend on the truth of the premises 
(whatever they may be in any and all such theistic applications). 
[I.e., because generally in any contingent demonstration of the 
understanding, the truth of the conclusion must depend upon the 
truth of the premises used to derive it--whenever it does not, 
there just is not really any logical derivation going on, and thus 
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the argument is simply invalid and does not really demonstrate 
anything.] 
2. But by definition, it is not the case that God's existence could 
so depend on the truth of any other contingent premise-set about 
the world. 
[I.e., just the other way around: God is precisely the being upo n 
which everything else, which could possibly be packed into the 
premise-set of any such contingent argument from facts of the 
world, is supposed to depend; thus when God is made to be a 
conclusion there could be no premises available from which to 
derive it, and so the consequent of (1) is false.] 
5. Therefore, by definition it is not the case that there is any pos- 
sible contingent demonstration of the understanding that succeeds 
in proving the existence of God. 
[I.e., the antecedent of (1) must also be false--from (1) and (2) 
by modus toIIens.] 
There appears to be an obvious equivocation here on the notion of 
'.dependence'. Admittedly, it is true in one sense of the term that to 
have an argument "means the dependence of one truth upon another," 
but it does not seem that the indepenedence of the existence of God 
as "simply and solely the ground of everything," must be incompatible 
with this sense of 'dependence' required merely by the format of any 
argument having premises and a conclusion. In general, which is how 
Hegel appears to be arguing it, logical dependency of premises and 
conclusion has very little to do with "grounds for being" (der Grund 
yore Sein) or what, as this expression would suggest, might be con- 
sidered an 'existential dependency' of some sort. Premises can logically 
imply all sorts of results as conclusions of deductively valid arguments 
without this meaning anything about the dependent relationships 
of existence that the things involved may bear to each other, how they 
came into being or are maintained, or anything of the kind. Retrodic- 
tions into the distant past of the constellations of celestial bodies can, 
from their present positions and the general principles of motion, 
gravitation, etc., that have prevailed since then, be expressed as the 
conclusions of valid deductive arguments; no one would contend, 
however, that this makes the position of a planet two thousand years 
76 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 
ago depend, in any sense relevant to its "being" where or what it 
was then, upon where it is now or upon physical laws subsequently in 
effect. If this were not obvious, one could, of course, just as easily 
turn the argument around and deduce a planet's present orbit in the 
same way as dependent upon the same laws and a past position. While 
it may be perhaps somewhat more plausible in this case that some 
such extra-logical dependency as required above might hold. (i) both 
of these arguments are equally valid; (ii) it would be arbitrary, then, 
as concerns the underlying "mode of proof" to attach any such special 
significance to the argument when it is going one way while not when 
the same kind ("mode") of argument is going the other; (iii) and yet 
surely two things do not mutually at the same time so depend upon 
each other's existence. 
Mere logical dependence, obtaining among propositions in proofs 
for deriving logical results, seems--as a matter of general observation 
about the process of ".demonstrating" conclusions, and to the contrary 
of what Hegel seems to be arguing above--something quite different 
from any deeper perplexity concerning dependency of 'being'. When 
in propping up premise (2) Hegel demands that God be "simply and 
solely the ground of everything and in so far not dependent upon 
anything else" (der Grund yore Allem und hiermit nicht abhiingig yon 
Anderem), the problem is how this sense of "dependency" (Abhiingig- 
keit) is supposed to get in the way of the sense in premise (1) by 
which demonstrations characteristically derive their conclusions, as 
in the illustration of physical laws: In premise (1) it is not, after all, 
really the truth of the conclusion which depends upon that of the 
premise (s) in the sense that the latter somehow, out in the real world 
of being and not merely as a logical relation inside of the argument, 
determines what that truth is to be--or  preserves it, provides any 
causal nexus for explaining it, etc., for whatever else may be sub- 
sumed under the rubric of regarding one thing as the "ground" of 
another thing's being the way it is. This does not follow as any part 
of the condition in the generalized bracketed reasoning behind the 
first premise, stipulating minimally only what is needed to get a 
logically sound proof, and where such extra-logical entailments may 
be running in even the reverse relationship to that "demonstrated" in 
the logical proof. 
The trick is sticking together these two distinct senses of depen- 
dency, and the glue which Hegel's argument appears implicitly to 
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rely on here is neither logic nor being, but rather a psychological aspect 
of contingent demonstrations in their capacity to impart new facts to 
those who contemplate them. The transition occurs above in the 
line, "...it can only mean [i] that the being of God is to depend on 
other terms, [ii] which will then constitute the ground of its being" 
(this identification stands out in the twin grammatical constructions 
of the original: "...so erhiiIt dies den Sinn, [i'] daft das Sein Gottes 
yon anderen Bestimmungen abhiingen solI, [ii'] daft diese also den 
Grund vom Sein Gottes ausmachen"). But the only way to get the ap- 
propriate meaning of "depending on" (abhiingen yon), thereby making 
good the "then" (the German 'also') inference, is to assume more 
than what we've seen above one is entitled to assume merely to get a 
logical demonstration that proves a conclusion from premises presup- 
posed (the Vorausgesetztes) for the sake of demonstration--otherwise 
the transition from (i) or (i') to (ii) and (ii') doesn't come .off. The 
only "extra-logical" relationship that this seems to involve, however, 
is again not one in which a (demonstrated) truth is depending upon 
another (presupposed) one, i.e., somehow in order to be the truth at 
all as a metaphysical fact; rather, in such demonstrations it is only the 
subjective recognition of such truths as depending upon the recogni- 
tion of others, i.e., as an epistemie fact, that is taking place. Thus it is 
in the above illustration where the truth of sci~entific laws and present 
astronomical data is not metaphysically responsible for any past events 
being what they are, but when exhibited in a persuasive demonstration 
can be epistemically responsible for their recognition as such. This 
equivocation is the backbone of Hegel's argument: Either the truth of 
premise (2), where the notion of 'dependency' has to be construed in 
the metaphysicN sense in order to make this premise true, is a non 
sequitur compatible with the consequent of (1) and rendering the 
argumen.t invalid; or the notion of 'dependency' in (1), in order to 
bring it in tune with the sense of (2), is hereby stripped of any support 
it could receive in its merely logical or psychological senses, rendering 
this premise false, and the argument so construed, if logically valid, 
nevertheless unsound. 
There may seem to be two loose ends to this criticism of Hegel-- 
one concerning the notion of the 'ground of being' characterizing 
God's relation to the world, and the other concerning the notion of 
theistic argument that he is rejecting as incapable of dealing with this 
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correctly. First, while the notion of 'dependence' for deductive de- 
monstrations is clear, no attempt has been made to clarify more 
exactly what the special sense of 'dependence' is in which the world 
'depends' on God. Indeed, it has been suggested only that this 
meaning, whatever it is, is at any rate distinct from the sense per- 
taining to deductive demonstrations, thus not precluding from the 
outset, as Hegel seems to argue it does, a successful one for God's 
existence. Some may find it unconvincing that this result could be 
established, a result about the relation of two things, until both of 
the two things have been adequately characterized, but especially in 
the case of the above argument, as one may be ("intuitively") inclined 
to counterargue that the dependence of the world on God is quite 
different from any contingent dependencies connecting objects in the 
world such as those involved in the laws of physics and planetary mo- 
tion. 
On examination, however, this does not appear very damaging to 
the criticism. The proper reply, it seems, merely to meet Hegel's ar- 
gument, does not have to contest this alleged discrepancy, nor, as 
would be needed in arguing it one way or the other, to delve in more 
precise terms into the concept of God and his special relation to the 
world vis-a-vis the mundane causality of material bodies. Causality 
provides an everyday garden variety of 'dependence' among objects 
in the world, and people argue down through the history of philo- 
sophy, in an explicitly theological context as well as in philosophy of 
mind, about how God is supposed to be regarded as "causing" the 
world itself to generate the special 'dependence'. Taking off from the 
familiar paradigm, this idea begins by "treating the world as a great 
big object," itself along with all of the objects it comprises (planets, 
or pool balls, as Hume preferred to discuss this topic), dependent on 
causative agency? Thus, for instance, one gets the creative cause in 
Christian theology, or, in greater philosophical dress, the "clock- 
winder" agency in Leibniz's theory of "pre-established harmony." 
Some of Descartes' argumentation in the Third Meditation seems to 
implicate God as both an initiating and sustaining, preservative "cause" 
of the world; while Spinoza's theory of God's "occasional" interven- 
tion can be viewed as breaking clown the latter theory of continuous 
causal agency to more specific kinds of events. Or in a similar way, 
See P.T. Geach's discussion of Aquinas in Geach and Anscombe, Three 
Philosophers (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961), pp. l l2ff. 
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Descartes' postulate of God as the cause of a certain idea could be 
seen to particularize Berkeley's theory of God as the cause of all 
ideas. Of course, some of this cosmic "cause-and-effect" application 
tends to deviate quite a bit from the normal sense of this notion--to 
be expected since the world is not a normal effect and God is not a 
normal cause: The usual temporal element, for instance, i.e., that 
causes precede their effects in time, seems to drop out, as developed 
in more recent commentary on Aquinas and the "first cause" of 
infinite regress arguments even traditionally conceived? 
But now none of the potential options of this sort of discussion 
seems to have any crucial impact which would rehabilitate Hegel's 
equivocation concerning the 'dependence' of the world on God and 
a conclusion about the mistake of traditional theistic arguments. None 
of these souped-up interpretations of cat~sation to accomodate God/ 
world dependence seems to have anything more to do with logical 
dependence in arguments, than does the case of normal "objects," 
planets and pool balls, etc. Calling attention to differences between 
these cases does not appear to help Hegel, since (i) the similarity 
common to all of them is at any rate that each seems to give an ac- 
count of why facts about the world are what they are, or how they 
come to be what they are, and it is this common element that argu- 
ments accounting only for logical relationships between facts, however 
produced, perpetuated, etc., do not seem to bring into question. On 
the other hand (ii), making an issue of dissimilarity here, dragging in 
as it does a special kind of dependence much more problematic and 
about which everyday intuitions are much more vague, would seem 
only to make it more difficult for Hegel to argue with clarity a 
general principle underwriting the contrary claim implicit in his above 
comments. This difficulty would also impede the project of showing 
such a connection between logical entailment and any more recent 
interpretations from modern theologians on what in these remarks is 
termed "ground of being." Hegel, at least, does not attempt to show 
anything of this nature, nor finally, any of the above connections 
either--rather, we've seen that Hegel does not appear to notice a dis- 
tinction requiring a connection of one kind of dependence to another. 
The argument appears simply to gloss over the distinction from the 
dependence of the world on God to a conclusion about the success of 
Patterson Brown, "Infinite Causal Regression," Phil. Review (1966). 
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the tradition of theological argumentation. The illustration of temporal 
causality is intended merely to delineate this general distinction, but 
to do this it does not seem necessary to explore in any further detail the 
various processes of determination, including any of God's alleged 
roles in this, that could conceivably be, or have historically been, 
proposed. The intent of the criticism against Hegel's argument should 
be satisfied if it can, on a level no more detailed than that on which 
Hegel's own argument operates, show a distinction in the senses of 
'dependence', and show that generally, in the case where intuitions 
are relatively clear, one cannot shift automatically from one to the 
other as Hegel seems to do. Of course, whether one can or cannot, 
at least when one does this should be announced. 
It may be felt that the foregoing criticism, having neglected then 
the second main aspect of Hegel's argument in its focus on demonstra- 
tions of understanding, is a hopeless straw-man construal missing 
entirely Hegel's point in the broader context of his philosophical 
system. The immediate context of Hegel's above remarks in w poses 
a dichotomy between the mode of demonstration by understanding, 
and another mode, the mode of reason. Hegel is much happier with 
this mode, and perhaps in assessing the two modes what is right with 
the latter, following as it does in the same paragraph, may be taken 
as a key to what is supposed to be wrong with the former. Dismissing 
the earlier suggestion that, with the failure of understanding, God's 
existence is undemonstrable (nicht zu beweisen), i.e., by any mode, 
Hegel says: 
Reason, however, and even sound common sense give demonstra- 
tion a meaning quite different from that of the understanding. 
The demonstration of reason no doubt starts from something 
which is not God. But, as it advances, it does not leave the 
starting-point a mere unexplained fact [als ein UnmitteIbares und 
Seiendes], which is what it was. On the contrary it exhibits that 
point as derivative and called into being, and then God is seen 
to be primary, truly immediate, and self-subsisting, with the 
means of derivation wrapped up and absorbed in himself [Gott 
aIs der die VermittIung in sieh auJgehoben Enthaltende, wahr- 
haft Unmittelbare, UrspriingIiehe und auf sich Beruhende].4 
4 HL p. 58; WL pp. 105f. Wallace's rendering of Hegel's "indem... so ergibt 
sich zugleich" construction by "and  then " may seem somewhat pale here in 
the last sentence of English text. Actually, on this particular occasion at least, 
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It is not clear what the proposed distinction here is; it does not 
seem to be raising a question of whether God's existence is provab le ,  
but it is not clear that what is in question could be characterized in 
a way that would promote Hegel's criticism of proofs from 'under- 
standing', or make any further tie-in between the theological argu- 
ments and his philosophy more generally. If the idea of proving God 
as "primary, truly immediate..." and so on, is what fundamentally 
distinguishes arguments of 'reason' from arguments of 'understanding', 
surely people in the history of "rational theology" who have argued 
the standard proofs for the existence of God have conceived of God 
in this way, and it is puzzling, then, what there could be about the 
proofs themselves, all motivated accordingly, that would differentiate 
them into Hegel's modes. The positive point here does not seem to 
carry out Hegel's preceding criticism, since the logical dependence 
of deductive conclusions on premises yielding them would presumably 
be a problem whether the argument conceives of God in this way or 
not. It is hard to see what contextual refinement could be performed 
on this criticism to salvage any observation that Hegel would want to 
make attaching significance to, or finding any "mistake" or "danger" 
in, the mere dependence of one truth on another in valid demonstra- 
t ions-this  dependence should itself be independent of the primacy of 
God, as for any other (meta)physical facts of the world, even if 
s o m e  theistic proofs, but not others, were shown somehow to com- 
promise this. 
As an example of a classical argument from reason which Hegel 
believes does not--which presumably handles God's primacy, im- 
mediacy, self-subsistance, etc., in the appropriate way--Hegel goes 
on in the above passage to submit this: 
Those who say: "Consider Nature, and Nature will lead you to 
God; you will find an absolute final cause" do not mean that 
God is something derivative: they mean that it is we who proceed 
to God himself from another; and in this way God, though the 
consequence, is also the ground of the initial step. 
Hegel's notorious proclivity for marathon syntax seems to go more smoothly 
than the edited dissection--which, under the auspices of translation in Hegel 
scholarship generally, can, it seems, also get out of hand at t{mes in the op- 
posite direction. 
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The idea of "final cause" here is not, as the conventional English 
expression might intuitively suggest, the terminal "cause" which one 
reaches (through "reason") going back in a sequence of causes, i.e., 
until "finally" reaching a first cause. This literal ambiguity is absent 
in the German Endzweck, i.e., (final) "design" or "purpose," indi- 
cating that it is the so-called "teleological" argument, and presumably 
not other "cosmological" forms, that Hegel means to be talking 
about? The direction of finality is that to which rather than Jrom 
which causes proceed, i.e., to some higher kind of "cause" (or Zweck) 
essentially unlike other (contingent) causes and which may seem in 
this sense more like an "effect"; Hegel wants to consider the peculiar 
God/world sense whereby all "causes" of the world are derivative of 
their overall "effect": the designed, purposive orientation toward 
which things proceed and in terms of which they are to be explained 
in a rational pattern. 
It is not clear what this example is supposed to exemplify, or again, 
how Hegel's above distinction is to apply selectively in view of other 
historical attempts to prove the existence of God. The 'reason'/'under- 
standing' distinction does not appear to be selecting out any idiosyn- 
crasy of teleological thought or anything particularly meritorious that 
is not inherent in contingent demonstrations generally. Certainly in 
any of the popular contingent arguments, even in any other cos- 
mological forms, the necessity, or "absoluteness," of the conclusion 
will serve to exhibit the contingency of whatever facts of the world 
are reported in the premises, which facts are seen, then, as "derivative" 
or "dependent" for their being upon God. Even in a standard causal 
regress argument the conclusion will presumably have this relation- 
ship to the premises and will provide an "explanation" for the con- 
tingent starting-point. This seems to be just the normal way in which 
Church Fathers like Aquinas argued for God in general. Certainly 
nobody in the history of "rational theology" which Hegel is addres- 
sing ever "means that God is something derivative" in this sense, but 
if not, then who is Hegel arguing against here? The conclusion that 
5 Hegel keeps this labelling separate in his kosrnoIogisch/physikotheologisch 
distinction at WL p. 130--designating "the Cosmological proof" and "the 
proofs of Natural Theology" in the translation at HL p. 80. (Hegel refers to 
both in the singular, i.e., as general forms of argumentation, though there are, 
of course, lots of variants of each.) The arguments are not always "so-called" 
(WL p. 131) 9 Sometimes 'cosmological' is used widely to include 'teleological': 
cf. John Hick, ed., The Existence of God (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1964), p. 71. 
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the traditional God exists, in an argument that "started from some- 
thing which is not God" but then ends up with God- -whether  the 
"prime mover" or (first) cause of the world, the "necessity" under- 
lying all "contingency" in nontemporal regress, or the telos of the 
universe, etc.--could never, as Hegel puts it, "leave the starting-point 
a mere unexplained fact." It must, rather, always be "the ground of 
the initial step," which position perforce confers its status as the 
wrapped up and absorbed," etc. (otherwise regresses would go on 
regressing) f inal  step. Thus, if the teleological argument exemplifies 
the mode of demonstration from 'reason', what standard theological 
arguments are there which do not?  The answer cannot be that the 
other main contingent arguments do, but that Hegel just doesn't con- 
sider any of them logically sound, since there would still remain the 
problem of pinning down Hegel's opposition and making sense of his 
entire commentary on 'reason' and 'understanding'; indeed, while this 
would simply be the traditional criticism, Hegel's criticism (of 'under- 
standing') has seemed to make validity even a handicap for good 
theological argumentation. This problem is perhaps more conspicuous 
in translation where Hegel commends argumentation that does not 
(criticizes argumentation that does) "leave the starting-point a mere 
unexplained fact, w h i c h  is w h a t  it was.  ''6 The suffixed phrase, absent 
in the structure of the German text, conveniently prompts curiosity in 
the relevance of Hegel's remarks to rational theology: Where or when 
"was" it ever supposed to have been this way- -who  are the theologians 
of 'understanding'? The inventory of historical endeavors to demon- 
strate God, but doing so through the inadequate mode and thus 
presumably deserving of Hegel's critique in w would seem very 
limited, in fact to be vacuous. 
Hegel's observation on the "final cause" argument seems to con- 
cede the very distinction between (psycho)logical and existential 
dependencies which the criticism of 'understanding' confused. Though 
Hegel has shifted from the expression "dependent" to "derivative" 
6 N. 4 supra. It is not clear whether the past tense "was" here is to be taken 
from a standpoint referring to the state of the premises before 'reason' explained 
them, or after 'understanding' failed: i.e., whether Wallace intends this 
redundancy as emphasis for the progress ("does not leave...what...was") that 
reason accomplishes on its, initially unexplained, starting-point, or whether it is 
meant to facilitate Hegel's contrast between what "was" (unexpla{ned) in 
(even the end-point of) the mode of understanding but is (now) rectified in the 
mode of reason. Of course, either sense of the nuance fits Hegel's message, and 
neither in Wallace purports actual rather than an expository past, though this 
is the main problem that Hegel's own exposition seems to leave. 
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(abhiingen/vermitteln) and though he is supposed to be characterizing 
demonstrat ions of reason, his discussion is acknowledging a kind of 
dependency or "derivat ive" relationship that obtains in the course of 
arguments (of reason) and consists merely in the fact that "it is we 
who proceed t o . . . "  the conclusion (God) from certain premises 
("from another"  state of affairs which is not the conclusion).  This 
is distinguished from the dependency of being that relates (recta)- 
physical facts of the world and pertains more fundamental ly  to the 
determination of why  (i.e., the question here of "explanat ion")  they 
are the facts of the world.  The former, as noted above, is a spin-off 
of logical dependency in demonstrations which demonstrate things to 
individuals who are benefiting epistemically f rom them; they function 
as instruments of discovery by which we proceed, and perhaps not 
how nature proceeds, to establish the facts inferred in the conclusion 
f rom those narrated in the premises. This is a purely subjective sense 
of what,  in the context of logical argumentation,  the notion of depen- 
dency can m e a n - - t h e  personal p ronoun " w e "  (wir) receiving italics 
in the original ( though not in Wal lace) ,  thus indicating Hegel 's  intent 
to stress this. 7 But if, as Hegel asserts for demonstrations of reason, 
logical derivation does not run any interference to the sense in which 
nature is "derivat ive" of God,  why  should it be so regarded in the ap- 
7 Of course, the idea of "explanation" may seem also quite "subjective," i.e., 
as characteristic of the process of mind by which we sentient perceivers read 
purposes or designs, or Hegel's Endzweeke, into the processes of nature. How- 
ever, Hegel's reference to God as "calling {nto being" the contingent facts of the 
world (the Vermitteltes und Gesetztes) seems to associate more closely the 
notion of teleology and purposive 'explanation' with natural processes, as just 
another "objective" aspect of their "being." Though it is a practical drawback 
of arguing from teleological explanations that the purposes of natural events 
are explained in terms of, and would appear rather to be indicative of, the 
purposes of humans, and are thus prone to vary with subjective assessments 
(vis-h-vis proverbial strange ones, like: rabbits have white tails for the purpose 
of making them easier to shoot; faces are equipped with noses in order to 
hold glasses in place; and so on), Hegel's appeal to the standard notion of 
"absolute cause," i.e., absoluter Endzweck (WL p. 106), dismisses any "sub- 
jective" or relativistic implication that may seem to attend the notion of 
'purpose' itself, relative to any aspirations, including those of a being conceded 
to be "absolute." With the dismissal, too, of any of the standard logistical 
problems of catering this argument to human aspirations (the problem-of-evil 
suggestion to turn the teleological argument inside out, the availability of 
"naturalistic" or evolutionary explanation for what remaining human-oriented 
telos there appears to be, etc.), presumably on this view the disclosure of con- 
flicting purposes of even, say, a deceased or retired clock-winder God would 
settle, even for beings with other purposes, what the unique (absolute) 'pur- 
pose oJ nature' is for them, as an "objective," metaphysical (not merely 
eschatological) statement about the events of nature themselves. 
HEGEL ON PROVING THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 85 
plication to understanding? The response to the argument in (1)-(5), 
consistent with Hegel's own admissions here, might be paraphrased in 
a medley of the corresponding passages applied equally to both modes: 
"Those who say that God can be derived by understanding from an as- 
sumed starting-point, rendering one truth 'derivative' of another...do 
not mean that God himself is something 'derivative'...they mean that 
it is we who proceed to God, whose existence we do not yet under- 
stand, from other truths of nature which we do (or we perhaps at 
least understand both better when the argument is over)." When the 
different senses of derivation are untangled, this line seems no more 
or less sensible for arguments of 'understanding' than arguments of 
'reason'. Hegel has not clearly delineated the two, and at any rate his 
critique of the first, even if meaningfully circumscribed, pivots on 
an equivocation which his own example further documents. 
Hegel's modes do not seem capable of supporting any plausible 
contention about the demonstrability of God's existence vis-a-vis 
traditional theology. What we've seen emerging here is, rather, a much 
more innocuous kind of claim about how valid or sound proofs for 
God's existence, every bit as cogent on one mode as the other, are 
merely to be regarded, or the proper attitude that one is to entertain 
when regarding them. Something like this is what seems to come 
across when Hegel's comments on proving God are placed in the 
broader context of the Logic as material tangential to the theme of 
this work. While Hegel's acceptance of 'reason' appears to add little 
clarification to his rejection of 'understanding', it might seem clear 
enough that Hegel's remarks bear some resemblance to a motif of 
his logic in the idea that conclusions of (theological) arguments must 
possess explanatory power for retroactively displaying ("exhibiting"/ 
aufzeigen) the derivative nature of the premises from which they have 
themselves derived. Hegel's system of thought is popularly considered 
to have a certain affinity to the idea that human experience be com- 
prehended in a stage-wise or "dialectical" process by which a conflict 
among inadequate or partial conceptions is resolved into a more 
complete and holistic one. The suggestion, alluded to earlier, is that 
the true significance of Hegel's comments on theology be construed, 
and vindicated, as conforming to this pattern. That Hegel's above 
point may be so inspired by a general disposition to how truths of 
the world are apprehended is perhaps more clearly brought out in what 
he says for conceptions of 'reason' than against those of 'under- 
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standing'. Under the 'mode of reason' the conclusion that God exists 
is regarded not merely as a logical product of antecedent conceptions 
or a deductive starting-point, but as "absorbing" the premises in itself 
and upholding their truth in a more enlightened perspective of the 
whole. One gets perhaps a kind of bootstrap phenomenon with the 
proofs of God viewed less as a linear progression through so many 
mechanical steps (some empirical data, a principle of reason or two, 
and a deductive presto, Q.E,D.) to a desired end, than a reciprocal 
exercise which, once started, establishes a relationship illuminating 
both ends. The distinction here is not really how to prove God's 
existence, but what it means to do so, and the whole point about pit- 
ting 'reason' against 'understanding' is that one represents a way of 
looking at the proofs more congenial to the Hegelian paradigm, where- 
as the other, consisting of a logically independent starting-point and 
(merely) a deductive consequent, does not enter into this "spirit." 
The question is no longer that of two different kinds of arguments 
in the history of theology to search for historical examples of--a  
question of arguments as they are, or as they should be, and where 
those of one kind presumably succeed while those of the other do not--  
rather, it is a question of two kinds of characterization for what the 
process itself of theological proofs is and has always been. 
J.N. Findlay suggests a view along this line for some of Hegel's 
comments in w According to Findlay in his foreword to the Wallace 
translation, the thesis that Hegel wishes to establish is not that (any 
of) the traditional proofs do not prove anything, but that "the so- 
called proofs of the Divine Existence are not what they are ordinarily 
thought to be." s The point which Findlay gleans from this is, viz., that 
they are not "purely affirmative reasonings in which," after Hegel's 
own wording above, "what we start from furnishes a fixed, solid 
basis from which we pass on to something which has the same solidity 
as its premises." Findlay quotes Hegel's observation on "the exalta- 
tion of the mind from the world to God" charging that "the meta- 
physical proofs of a God are deJective interpretations of the process" 
(mangelhaJte Auslegungen und Be schreibungen); Hegel indicates that 
the defect of the demonstrative process of exalting minds to God 
does not "express" merely "with sufficient prominence" the 
"real being" or "absolute truth" of God. This is different from saying 
s HL p. xii, 
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that the process--i.e., in the previous (w phraseology, by which 
"we (or the mind) proceed(s)"  to God--does not work, that the 
theistic proofs cannot be said to prove the conclusion that God exists, 
i.e., or "express" this proposition at all. While presumably no logical 
process of earthly minds will ever "sufficiently" or "prominently" 
enough be able to deliver "absolute truth" or "real being" from con- 
tingent facts of appearance, Hegel evidently concedes that the tradi- 
tional proofs, even given his criticism, do succeed in expressing their 
result? 
Findlay sees the criticism on the lesser count of "insufficient pro- 
minence" as a corollary to Hegel's dialectic; here on the proofs of 
God, but for Hegel generally: 
The action of thought is to negate the basis from which it starts, 
to show it up as not being self-subsistent, and so to have in it 
a springboard from which it can ascend to what is truly self- 
subsistent and self-explanatory. 
Hegel's entire treatment of the "process" of theological argumentation 
in w is seen as a replication of the dialectical process: 
In this passage Hegel not only explains the argument for self- 
explanatory, absolute being, he also explains the whole nature of 
the dialectic. Nowhere does it merely elicit what some firm basis 
entails: everywhere does it rather overturn its basis as in- 
volving incompleteness or conflict, and then progresses by a leap 
to something more harmonious and complete. 
Thus, the critique of 'understanding' from which, incorrectly on this 
interpretation, the argument of (1)-(3) was constructed, would for 
Findlay be a statement of the correct dialectical outlook on what, 
generally, the nature of theological argumentation is: 
Those who expect all thought-advance to be that of the deduction 
of conclusions from firmly established premisses are quite in- 
9 HL pp. 81f; corresponding passage, WL p. 132. Hegel's charge that the 
qualified with the disclaimer, oder vielmehr nicht herausheben, i.e., or much 
more, or more accurately, do not render prominent, emphasize, etc., the ap- 
propriate nature of the thing they express. The Wallace translation combines 
the overstatement and the relation which in the original makes this point itself 
more prominent. 
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capable of dialectical thinking: in dialectic it is the insufficiency 
of the premisses that leads to the more sufficient conclusion. 1~ 
There are arguments, of course, whose premises are "insufficient," not 
merely in the metaphorical rhetoric of 'firmness' or 'stability', but be- 
cause they are false, or do not deductively entail the alleged conse- 
quent, so that in either case the conclusion of the argument is not 
"expressed" by the premises. This, however, is not Hegel's criticism of 
the arguments for the existence of God. 
In lieu of a survey of "the whole nature of the dialectic," which ad- 
mittedly may shed textual insight on at least the biographical question 
of Hegel's inlentions, there is still a problem for the Findlay interpreta- 
tion as to what the net significance of Hegel's commentary in this and 
the preceding discussion comes to. If Hegel's objection throughout all 
of this is that the traditional demonstrations of rational theology are 
simply "not what they are ordinarily thought to be," there is still the 
problem of identifying what in fact they were in the history of rational 
theology ordinarily thought to be, and specifically, who thought them 
to be like that. Hegel does not seem to be proposing anything new or 
out of the ordinary about the relation between God and the world, 
or the contingent facts constituting the world and sometimes packed 
into theological arguments. It seems quite common among theologians 
to think of God as self-subsistent, wrapped up and absorbed, and so 
on. The suggestion merely that one conceive of God, or the con- 
clusion that God exists, in the prescribed way, certainly does not seem 
to implement the earlier distinction between 'teleological' and (other) 
'cosmological' forms, or any point about how those who propound them 
regard the role of contingent premises--as illustrated, for instance, in 
the case of Aquinas, who argued both forms. God is quite ordinarily 
conceived as the necessary or self-explanatory being, and facts of the 
world, including those invoked in the standard theistic arguments, as 
contingent, requiring a necessary "basis," unexplained and requiring 
explanations, etc., which it is precisely the essential function of the 
traditional arguments to provide. What does Hegel's dialectic add to 
this? There still seems to be a problem of locating any historical target 
that Hegel's insight is supposed to b e shooting at here, even on Find- 
lay's more sporty characterization. 
lo HL pp. xiif. 
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The dialectical significance of 'reason' has not made it obvious that 
rational theology suffers an improper reliance upon 'understanding'; 
nor does it ensure that Hegel's polemic against the latter is free of 
the confusion noted in w The "mistake" which Hegel debits to the 
account of those working in the tradition of rational theology, who 
have formulated the arguments of this tradition and have done the 
"ordinary" thinking about them, appears not to pertain to the manner 
in which they ordinarily thought of their arguments--since there is 
no evidence of their having so mistaken any such ontological status 
of their premises as "dependent," "derivative," "explained" by, etc., 
the nature of God--but  again only conceivably to the mere fact that 
they were presenting logically deductive "one-truth-on-another" argu- 
mentation at all. But Hegel, as we've seen, clearly cannot have this 
criticism, since it rests on equivocation. If, as Hegel's own criticism of 
the 'understanding' seems to do, anyone arguing for the existence of 
God really were "mistaking" the derivation going from the world to 
God in a logical demonstration, with the "exaltation of the mind" 
(Hegel's expression Erhebung here being variously translated in Wal- 
lace as "exaltation" and "upward spring") as involving an ontological 
dependence of God on the world, then perhaps the appropriate thing 
to say about this would be that such a person simply did not have in 
mind the right object of the argument in the first place, that the 
argument is demonstrating something other than the traditional con- 
cept of God. But it would be very bizarre if Hegel's criticism that 
rational theology has historically been laboring under the too myopic 
view of 'understanding' hereby reduced to calling all of the Church 
Fathers atheists, and if this is the objection, it could surely have been 
more incisively put. 
It is difficult to gather from this general contemplation of God 
and the world any very helpful instruction that Hegel's dialectic has 
for reconceiving the traditional arguments of theology. This is ap- 
parent upon consideration of the arguments and the traditional con- 
ception of them, but more so as one looks closer at the dialectic and 
Hegel's conception of it. Surely the issue at stake for Hegel is not 
whether "all thought-advance [is] to be that of the deduction of con- 
clusions from firmly established premises" but whether, no "thought- 
advance" can be made this way, whether all thought-advance has to 
be made some other way. This seems to be Hegel's alternative and 
the view underlying Findlay's above suggestion linking Hegel's other 
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way, the dialectical method, with the proofs of God. By Hegel's 
method, the discovery of truth evolves in a triadic succession of 
"moments" in thought, synthesizing a comprehensive moment of 
"harmony" out of an ostensible contradiction of "incomplete" mo- 
ments. But this does not seem to be what's going on in the theistic 
arguments, either on Hegel's view or on Findlay's reconstrual of it. 
It is not being asserted, after all, that the premises of theistic argu- 
ments really do "conflict" with or (even ostensibly) contradict each 
other. In what following the premise-stage is really the only other stage 
to a theistic argument, the conclusion that God exists--presumably an 
important existential fact (other qualities of God's existence aside for 
the "moment") toward (at  least a more) "complete" picture of the 
world--again is not "harmonizing" antithetical elements in doing so. 
It seems to stretch the point to say that the conclusion here, as Find- 
lay puts it, is "negating" or "overturning" premises: The resolution or 
harmonizing of conflict takes place only if there is conflict or discord 
to be resolved or harmonized, and one presumably does not "overturn" 
something which is merely "incomplete"--one simply completes it. 
This kind of harsher 'negating/overturning' characterization seems to 
outdo the idea of theologians diving off "springboards" of logic. 11 
With the exaggeration of 'incompleteness' into the notion of 'conflict', 
or when the starting-point is this radically "insufficient," i.e., to the 
extent that the premises are self-contradictory rather than merely not 
"self-subsistent," Hegel's "leap of reason" here begins to look more 
like Kierkegaard's "leap of faith" than anything that could be asso- 
ciated with Aquinas' logical deductions. 
It is unclear what it is about the premise-conclusion structure of the 
deductive proofs of God for which Hegel means his dialectical model 
to provide a less "defective description." One might think perhaps that 
a part of rational theology at least remotely suggestive of this more 
extreme analogizing to Hegelian dialectic would be causal regress 
argumentation. As accentuated in perhaps the most generous view 
with a formulation in reductio ad absurdum format, the prospect of 
tracing back an infinite series of causes may appear to give rise to a 
contradiction or to 'conflict' with the existence of causation in the 
world: Thus, it may be felt that an explanatory regress cannot stop 
without leaving the last examined cause itself uncaused, or again, that 
n Hegel too indulges in some poetic eloquence here, complementing the notion 
of Erhebung with the term Sprung, WL p. 131. 
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it cannot go on forever, either, without leaving even the cause one 
started with, or the infinite series itself, ultimately unexplained. This 
predicament, then, might seem to provide ideal bait for a resolution 
or "harmonization" in the dialectical model as the mind is "exalted," 
etc., to a higher necessary cause. Unfortunately, Hegel himself, we've 
seen, does not seem to take such cosmological argumentation as 
exemplary. Though of course any logical proof can be given reductio 
style, Hegel's own example of the teleological argument would seem 
to lend itself more reluctantly to even this intuitive sense of paradox 
or conflict in its premises. It certainly does not embody this idea 
more perspicuously than other contingent argumentation, which if it 
is tempting to think should be refiled as argumentation that Hegel 
also approves, would .again seem to deplete the supply of arguments 
that he is supposed to disapprove. 
While it is questionable in what descriptive aspect the dialectic 
could apply to theology and whether Findlay captures an intelligible 
sense of even Hegel's intention generally, it appears especially prob- 
lematic here that Findlay's suggestion could clarify what Hegel in- 
tends in w It is not on this paradoxical nature of the premises 
that Hegel's highlighting of the teleological example in that passage 
seemed to focus. The focus of the example in w is, rather, the "wrap- 
ped up" and "absorbed" character of the conclusion, which need not 
involve, nor does Hegel indicate it involves, the idea of conflict and 
negation that concerns Findlay in w Though this observation about 
self-subsistence, and so on, in conclusions, again charitably entertained 
at some distance, may recommend itself in a very general way to 
some skeletal aspect of Hegel's model when the conclusion happens to 
be God, still the "dialectical" concept seems to drop out. It seems 
difficult here to pursue the Findlay route with any deeper connection 
to Hegel's phases of 'understanding' and negative and positive 'reason' 
lurking around in Findlay's reference to w and elaborated by Hegel 
in w167 Even if one could read Hegel's three stages into the 
traditional theological demonstrations with neat little verstiindige, 
negativ-verniinJtige, and positiv-verniinftige components running 
through them, this does not square with the w criticism where some 
portions of rational theology, or entire (cosmological) premise-con- 
clusion proofs, were being characterized as stuck somehow in an 
"understanding" stage. While that earlier criticism did not seem con- 
vincing, it is similarly not clear here how Hegel or Findlay distinguish 
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regarding the premises alone of a deductive proof as representing a 
stage of 'understanding', from thinking in the correct dialectical mode 
about them. As has been noted, it can surely be presumed that the 
historical inventors of the arguments were aware of the contingent, 
dependent, transitory, apparent, etc., nature of the world, and facts 
about it, in their premises, while they should have been equally 
aware--and the Hegelian dialectic, nevertheless, does not enhance the 
aptitude of the finite mind to be more "sufficiently" aware--of the 
necessity, self-subsistence, eternal being (in the Findlay citation: 
"beyond and above that appearance," the "real being" and "absolute 
truth" of the universe), etc., of the nature of God in the conclusion. If 
this is supposed to be what it means to view the premises as "fixed" 
and "solid" (das Festes), then the only thing in the history of philo- 
sophy that would seem to satisfy Hegel's criterion of viewing them 
as provisional "springboards" would be, not any possible version of, 
or version of thinking of, the traditional theological arguments them- 
selves, but rather something very much like their use in the infamous 
Cartesian circle. 
Despite the difficulty in how Hegel's 'reason'/'understanding' dis- 
tinction cuts across the historical enterprise of proving God and 
provides a basis for criticizing (or applauding) any of the contingent 
arguments, the tenor of Hegel's foregoing discussion may allow one 
to anticipate Hegel's favorable disposition to theistic argumentation 
which does not rely upon contingent premises. If insisting that con- 
tingency in logical demonstrations somehow compromises the necessary 
being of God, Hegel endorses the style of proof undertaken in the 
ontological argument. This approach is intimated in Hegel's remarks 
on the nature of God and of dialectical conclusions in that it does not 
go from the world to God at all, but rather proceeds from the con- 
cept of God, to God, by "unwrapping" the ("self-subsistent" and "ab- 
sorbed") content of that concept. However, as before in the criticism 
of contingent proofs, there is nothing in Hegel's endorsement of the 
ontological proof that appears to profit in any distinctive way from 
the dialectic. Hegel has not gotten much mileage out of the dialectic 
for any novel insight into the concept of God, and it is awkward 
trying to go any further here with the nomenclature of 'negating' and 
'overturning'. It is an interesting contrast to the preceding case, and 
other arguments of 'reason', that not even Hegel tries to explicate 
this process of the mind to God on the dialectical model. In the case 
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of the ontological argument it is certainly still less plausible that the 
existence of God in the conclusion could be reconciling any insuf- 
ficiency, contingent or otherwise, inherent to the premises, since the 
"starting-point" of this argument already is God. Certainly no part of 
this starting-point is being negated or overturned by anything else in 
the argument, nor is there any leap to something more "harmonious 
and complete" encompassing or explaining the starting-point--just the 
opposite: The conclusion is no more "sufficient," or even meaningful, 
than the initial concept (which is exactly how some have attacked 
the argument), and the scope of the conclusion is actually more 
restricted than the premise, picking out and concentrating upon only 
one attribute (existence) presumably already present in the starting 
concept (the ontological argument could in theory be used to generate 
other less controversial attributes). Whatever its amenability to the 
dialectic, Hegel cannot, of course, claim the patent on this technique 
of argument, and Hegel's approval does not avail itself of any essen- 
tially revamped version (Auslegung orBeschreibung) of the argument, 
but rather is confined solely to refuting Kant's refutation of it. 
In w of the Logic, Hegel says this about Kant's celebrated refuta- 
tion of the ontological argument: 
The uniformly favourable reception and acceptance which at- 
tended Kant's criticism of the Ontological proof was undoubtedly 
due to the illustration which he made use of. To explain the dif- 
ference between thought and being, he took the instance of a 
hundred [British] sovereigns [the kind you put in a "man's purse" 
(Taler)], which, for anything it matters to the notion, are the 
same hundred whether they are real or only possible, though the 
difference of the two cases is very perceptible in their effect on 
a man's purse. 
Continuing, Hegel assents--in fact "nothing can be more obVious" 
(einteuchtend)--to the principle that "anything we only think or 
conceive is not on that account actual," but finds its development in 
Kant's illustration objectionable (in Hegel's more cautious phrasing, 
a "barbarism of language"; more literally, Hegel's locution, eine Bar- 
barei, doesn't narrow it down to language). Hegel objects apparently 
to the presupposition of the analogy, that we have "notions" (Begri]Je) 
of things like a hundred sovereigns. This objection, however, receives 
only a secondary billing in the original, where it is relegated to the 
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prefatory clause of another statement reiterating in more detailed 
philosophical guise the obvious thought/actuality principle (the trans- 
lation, enacted with the routine hatchet editing on sentence structure, 
obscures somewhat the intended relation and importance of these ob- 
servations) : 
And [misleading, since this point has already been made], putting 
that mistake [the 'notion' problem] aside, those who perpetually 
urge against the philosophic Idea the difference between Being 
and Thought might have admitted that philosophers were not 
wholly ignorant of the fact. Can there be any proposition more 
trite than this? 
Thus, arriving at what seems to be his primary objection, Hegel ob- 
serves: 
But after all, it is well to remember, when we speak of God, that 
we have an object of another kind than any hundred sovereigns, 
and unlike any one particular notion, representation, or however 
else it may be styled. It is in fact this and this alone which marks 
everything finite: its being in time and space is discrepant from 
its notion. God, on the contrary, expressly has to be what can 
only be 'thought as existing'; his notion involves being. It is this 
unity of the notion and being that constitutes the notion of God) 2 
In the long version of the Science oJ Logic published before the 
Encyclopedia, Hegel's response does expend at least a few remarks to 
give some additional philosophical articulation, as part of his discus- 
sion of 'Being' generally, to the preliminary point (Kant's Barbarei) 
shoved aside in the later work: 
But this so-called concept of the hundred dollars [A. V. Miller, 
also an Englishman, deciding to do it phonetically] is a spurious 
concept; the form of the simple self-relation does not belong to 
such a limited, finite content itself; it is a borrowed form attached 
to it by the subjective understanding; the being of the hundred 
dollars is not self-related but alterable and perishable. 
~ H L  pp. 84f; W L  pp. 135f. 
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Here too, while accusing Kant of a "confused clumsiness" (verwor- 
rene SchwerJiilligkeit) in the distinction between the 'concept' (for 
Hegel "figurate conception" (die Vorstellung)) of, say, a hundred 
dollars on the one hand, and "the state of my fortune" on the other, 
Hegel impugns the attractiveness of Kant's argument as being induced 
by the simplistic illustration: 
The main thesis of the Kantian criticism was that existence or 
being (these being taken here as synonymous) is not a property 
or real predicate, that is to say, is not a concept of something 
which could be added to the concept o] a thing . . . .  This criticism, 
through its popular example, has made itself universally plausible: 
who does not know that a hundred actual dollars are different 
from a hundred merely possible ones? that they make a difference 
to the state of my fortune? Because this difference is so obvious 
with the hundred dollars, therefore the concept, that is, the 
specific nature of the content as an empty possibility, and being, 
are different from each other; therefore the Notion of God too 
is different from his being, and just as little as I can extract from 
the possibility of the hundred dollars their actuality, just as little 
can I extract from the Notion of God his existence; but the on- 
tological proof is supposed to consist of this extraction of the 
existence of God from his Notion. 
And so again Hegel's reply: 
Now though it is of course true that Notion is different from 
being, there is a still greater difference between God and the 
hundred dollars and other finite things. It is the deJinition oJ 
finite things that in them the Notion is different from being, that 
Notion and reality, soul and body, are separable and hence that 
they are perishable and mortal; the abstract definition of God, 
on the other hand, is precisely that his Notion and his being are 
unseparated and inseparable. The genuine criticism of the cate- 
gories and of reason is just this: to make intellect aware of this 
difference and to prevent it from applying to God the determina- 
tions and relationships of the finite. (Miller's italics, following 
Hegel's throughout.) 1~ 
13 Hegel's Science o] Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (London: George Allen & Un- 
win LTD, 1969), pp. 86-90. WissenschaJt der Logik (Surkamp, Vol. 5), pp. 88-92. 
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As an argument aimed to knock down Kant's objection to the 
ontological argument, this commentary does not seem very impressive, 
or regardless of whether Kant's objection may indeed be mistaken, to 
show with much plausibility what is mistaken about it. Hegel, we see, 
finds the distinction between thought and being "obvious" (and 
"tr i te"--Hegel 's  own word,  "trivial," losing out to the translator's 
quest for adventure) and apparently considers it naive of Kant to 
have made this point or to have based his objection on it. Actually, 
if there is any naivet~ going on here, it seems much more obviously 
to be Hegel's assumption, and the argument which he then bases his 
argument on, that this really is Kant's point against the ontological 
argument. When the distinction between thought and being is merely, 
as Hegel quite aptly acknowledges, the fairly unexciting idea that 
thinking things does not make them so, this distinction can surely 
have very little to do with what is Kant's objection, viz., that existence 
is not a predicate. Of course, imagining lots of things about objects of 
thought other than their being (in existence) does not make it so 
either, i.e., as is also very obvious when objects do indeed have being 
and are seen, moreover, to be otherwise: even though these other 
things may be perfectly legitimate predicates. The idea that 
"anything we only think or conceive is not on that account ac tua l"- -  
this idea pertaining to the existence of objects, but subsuming any 
genuine predicates as well--sweeps too broadly to accomodate Kant's 
point about what is or is not a predicate. What Kant presumably 
wants to show is (i) that asserting the existence of an object is, 
qualitatively in some way, different in kind from asserting other things 
about it, and (ii) that this difference renders the former not a "predi- 
cate." Thus, as perhaps better indicating the sense of this contention, 
it would be meaningful to ask whether a hundred dollars one may 
have in mind exists in one's purse as well, while it would not be 
meaningful, for the case of nonexistence, to ask whether the concept 
of a hundred dollars one is entertaining should really be ninety-nine 
or one hundred and one. It would not be a too arduous feat to show 
that existence is at any rate a rather weird predicate, but whether Kant 
is right or not, there is certainly nothing "trite" or "trivial" about this 
position, and in fact it has, of  course, been heartily disputed. 14 
14 In G.E.  Moore's epic essay, "Is Existence a Predicate?" presented with a 
rejoinder in Alvin Plantinga, ed., The Ontological Argument (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1965), pp. 71-110. 
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It is unlikely, then, that Kant's illustration of the hundred dollars, 
if as Hegel claims its only purpose is to draw the general distinction 
between thought and being, could really be, as Hegel also claims, what 
makes or ever did make Kant's objection to the ontological argument 
seem persuasive. The purpose of Kant's illustration is not, after all, 
this general distinction, but rather, as a close reading even of Hegel's 
own remarks in the earlier Science oJ Logic (omitted in the Ency- 
clopedia) indicates, is and in fact contrary to Hegel's claim seems 
fairly well understood to be, that the content of a concept is not 
itself enlarged through instantiation out in the world; existence is 
not one of the "predicates" which go into constituting or determining 
what a given concept is a concept of. Thus, one does not alter the 
concept of a hundred dollars by saying that a hundred dollars exists 
in any given person's purse. But now this--specifying a general rela- 
tion between concepts, their nature and determination on the one 
hand, and existence or their instantiation on the other--is very dif- 
ferent from asserting merely that thinking things so does not make 
them so, a claim that would be true whether existence were a "pred- 
icate" or not. If existence were a predicate for building concepts, th~n 
since fantasizing still of course does not change the world, this would 
simply generate the idea of concepts that are incorrectly built. Along 
with the possibility of seIJ-contradictory concepts, concepts whose 
"predicate" elements conflict amongst themselves, one would have the 
additional possibility of conflict with the real world of being. Hegel 
himself already authorizes the idea of "false" or "spurious" concepts 
on the different considerations (involving "'self-relation," etc.) when 
he criticizes Kant's alleged concept of a hundred dollars: viz., as not 
really being one, as being, rather, improperly put together (Hegel's 
own locution, fatscher Begriff, literally "false concept"). The point 
is that there is at least nothing absurd in this view, as there presumably 
is in the general view that thinking propositions makes them true; nor, 
again then, should Kant's position on the former, denying that exis- 
tence is a predicate, seem at all trivial, since with this view the on- 
tological argument, for anything that has been said here, really is out 
of business. Existence is excluded as any internal part of concepts 
that can ever have determinant bearing on content; thus, lust as the 
concept of a hundred dollars is not itself in any way augmented by the 
external circumstance that it is, or is thought to be, existentially in- 
stantiated, so the concept of God, as the being than which none 
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greater can be conceived, does not raise the question of whether that 
content is something which could ever be greater or lesser as a func- 
tion of whether it is thought to be realized in the wor ld - - any  variant 
of the ontological argument which in this way "predicates" existence 
as a determinator of conceptual content fails with a false premise. 15 
This "so" is no t  very well represented in Hegel's "therefore" above. 
While Hegel does appropriately characterize the consequent as a view 
about the nature of concepts, the rendering of the illustration in the 
antecedent should also be, the simply more general form of, the same 
kind of view; whereas Hegel seems to picture Kant as trying to 
squeeze the desired result out of the difference merely between having 
a hundred dollars and not having a hundred dollars. This is not what 
Kant had in mind, and it is very doubtful that this has been a rampant 
inference in the minds of Kant 's readers either. 
This seems to take care of Hegel's main point about the eccentricity 
of the concept of God. It  does not matter whether the substantive 
point in Kant 's illustration is trite or trivial, but only whether, properly 
understood, it's true. If one obliges Hegel's suggestion to set aside 
the incidental obstacle that a hundred dollars is not a concep t - -  
presumably the conceptual-determination/existential-instantiation dis- 
tinction could as easily be made with a concept of some other finite 
entity to Hegel's liking and passing his test of self-relation--Hegel 's  
argument amounts to the claim that it is not, i.e., as applied to the 
distinctive concept of an infinite God. This does not seem a very 
profound reply to Kant. Surely it settles very little to say merely that 
Kant's illustration, with a non-"spurious" concept plugged in, then, 
works very well for finite concepts, while it is the "abstract definition" 
of the concept of God that existence be a predicate only in this one 
15 There need be no quarrel here with any view about the computation of 
'greatness': The ontological argument does not, as does one of Descartes' ar- 
guments postulating God as the necessary cause of an idea, have any immediate 
interest in evaluating the greatness of concepts, nor does Kant's point hinge in 
any way on the greatness of existence: Existence may well be the nobler part 
of being, i.e., it may be greater in some sense to exist than not to exist, but 
this proposition is simply irrelevant for the ontological argument if existence is 
not a predicate of concepts. (Some existent objects may concur in this proposi- 
tion, or in how much worse it would be to cease existing, etc.; or again, one 
might even concede that a concept is somehow, though not in virtue of its 
predicate constituents, a greater concept whenever it is a fact that its object 
exists, or when the concept is actually conceived, and so on.) One would still 
not be conceiving a greater being simply by think{ng that it exists, or violating 
the concept formula for God by thinking he doesn't. 
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special case. If Kant's view that existence is not a predicate is correct, 
then the special case would simply be another "false concept" in viola- 
tion of this general rule of concept-building in the familiar case, and 
the bare assertion that there is one exception to the rule is nothing 
but a point-blank repetition of the ontological argument. Certainly, in 
general, it does not constitute a very awesome defense to concede that 
one's view is successfully falsified as a rule in all other cases, but 
is therefore to be declared simply an exception. To simulate the same 
rough treatment given Kant here in a point that might as forcefully be 
turned around on Hegel: Surely one defending the ontological argu- 
ment cannot assume that the philosophers criticizing the argument are 
so ignorant as not to have recognized the privileged status claimed 
for the concept of God, and that this is  indeed what the ontological ar- 
gument is all about. While Hegel seems to saddle Kant's criticism with 
some trivial exploitation of a practical difference between having an 
actual God and a merely possible God, it is of course the whole 
strategy of the ontological argument that there is a conceptual dif- 
ference between this case and all others which, for it, makes mere 
possibility impossible. No propounder of the ontological argument 
ever suggested that the case of God was not unique or that the argu- 
ment could be applied to finite objects, and so it is difficult to see 
how Hegel's response--essentially that the concept of God is in this 
crucial respect to the argument different from all other finite ones--  
constitutes much of an advance here. 
At most what could perhaps emerge from this is not a new way to 
refute Kant, but merely another way to refute Gaunilo: At the time 
Saint Anselm premiered the ontological argument, monk Gaunilo's 
reductio ad absurdum objection against it, that if the argument went 
through for God then one would be licensed under the same logic to 
think lots of other things into existence as well, was quashed by 
Anselm on grounds that this move for other ("greatest possible") 
objects (including finite ones) was, in effect, not conceivable, as there 
were no other real concepts for the argument to operate on. In contrast, 
the residual implication of Hegel's commentary would be to redirect 
Kant's criticism, now against Gaunilo instead of Anselm, so as to 
provide yet another reason why objects other than God will not be 
able to claim existence in their concepts, viz., since for them existence 
is not a predicate that could belong to any concept of a thing, even if 
such concepts were possible. This would surely have to seem less con- 
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vincing to Gaunilo than what Anselm originally told him, for the 
simple reason that the answer, i.e., as it should seem unconvincing 
to Kant as well, sounds like such an ad hoc abutment of the question. 
Again, surely anyone disposed to criticizing the ontological argument 
in the first place has noted, if nothing else, that God is indeed sup- 
posed to be infinite, and here in this instance a concept is indeed 
supposed to contain existence as a predicate and to be therein essen- 
tially different from all other concepts. Hegel, we see, once the main 
thrust of his response is sifted out from the confusion and historical 
mistreatment that characterize his discussion on this topic, does little 
more than agree. 
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